

**Neville Chamberlain:  
The Desperate Search for  
Peace in Europe**

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In 1929, the world plunged into a depression. No country was immune to the economic crisis. In the United States, unemployment reached 30% in 1933. The British Empire was on the brink of bankruptcy in 1931. Despite the hard times faced by these two major economic powers, the situation in Germany was more severe. Already economically crippled by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the German people did not have anything to fall back to when the world economy collapsed. Inflation, already a problem in Germany before 1929, crippled the German people. This situation resulted in the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Adolph Hitler in Germany. From the beginning, Hitler spoke of returning Germany to its position among the leaders of the world. However, in order to do this Germany would need to reclaim its colonies it lost in the Treaty of Versailles as well as control over its economically vital territory. This attempt at rebuilding the German nation put the country in conflict with Europe's main power, Great Britain, but this conflict did not have to mean war. Britain's leader, Neville Chamberlain, understood the economic conditions of Britain and the rest of Europe. He also understood the situation in the rest of the world in regards to the British Empire's collective security against aggression by Italy in Africa and Spain and the Japanese in China. To Chamberlain, this meant avoiding war for social and economic reasons at all cost, which forms the basis of his appeasement policy from 1937-1940.

To understand the policies of Great Britain under Chamberlain's control, one must understand the desire of Chamberlain to avoid another great continental war. On July 2, 1938 in a speech at a National Government rally at Kettering he said,

When I think of those four terrible years and I think of the 7,000,000 of young men who were cut off in their prime, the 13,000,000 who were maimed and mutilated, the misery and suffering of the mothers and fathers, the sons and daughters, and the relatives and the friends of those who were killed, and the wounded, then I am bound to say again what I have said before, and what I say now, not only to you, but to all the

world – in war, whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers.

It is those thoughts which have made me feel that it was my prime duty to strain every nerve to avoid a repetition of the Great War in Europe. And I cannot believe than anyone who is not blinded by party prejudice, anyone who thinks what another war would mean, can fail to agree with me and to desire that I should continue my efforts.<sup>1</sup>

It is this intense desire to avoid a war that lead Chamberlain to pursue his goal of appeasing the German and Italian dictators of their demands, which would pacify their desire to go to war to meet those demands. However, to call Chamberlain a pacifist is incorrect. His policies of appeasement were based on a desire to avoid war because of the loss of human life as well as the loss of money that was desperately needed to solve the economic problems in Britain caused by the worldwide depression of the 1930s. Chamberlain believed another war would bankrupt the British Empire. In addition, even though Chamberlain remained one hundred percent committed to his policy of appeasement, he also set Britain on a course of a cautious rearmament that would ready his country in case the appeasement policy did not bring about its desired result.

As chancellor of the Exchequer Chamberlain had overseen the recovery of the British economy from near bankruptcy in 1931 to a 1936 situation of stability. Despite the recovery, Chamberlain still worried about factors that could threaten the future stability of the economy. The trade deficit of Britain in 1936 continued a twenty-year trend of Britain importing more than it was exporting. In 1936 the deficit was £260 million, up from £185 million in 1935. To put these numbers in perspective to what Chamberlain saw as a problem was the 1922 trade deficit of £77 million. A massive rearmament campaign would further the trade deficit and deplete the Empire of money it needed for recovery. The unemployment rate in Britain (see table 1) also threatened the future stability of the economy. Although unemployment had significantly decreased it was still too high for Chamberlain's comfort.<sup>2</sup> These economic conditions placed Britain

in a tough position of trying to face aggressive actions by Hitler and Mussolini without causing a severe economic crisis.

TABLE 1 Unemployment percentages by divisions (July each year)

Region	1912	1929	1932	1936
London	8.7	4.7	13.1	6.5
Midlands	3.1	9.5	21.6	9.4
Scotland	1.8	11.2	29.0	18.0
Wales	3.1	18.8	38.1	28.5

Source: Aldcroft, Derek H., *The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939* (1979), 80.

This increase in productivity throughout Britain in the 1930s also had the effect of solving the budget problems that almost left the British Empire bankrupt in 1931. An astute politician, Chamberlain took credit for the economic recovery, which led to his rise in political power. Chamberlain used this increase in political power to step into the discussion of British foreign policy. Chamberlain believed the troubled economies of Germany and Italy, combined with the expansion of the Japanese into China, threatened the political and economic security of the British. Chamberlain believed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 was the cause of the worldwide depression and that fixing the flaws of the treaty would bring about economic stability, and peace, to the world. Chamberlain further believed, as did many others in Europe, the treaty had unfairly punished the German people and that the demands they made were entirely within reason and should, if possible, be granted.<sup>3</sup>

Chamberlain's beliefs about the world's economic security was tested in early 1936 when Germany moved its army into the Rhineland and Italy's aggression on the country of Abyssinia. In addition to the Rhineland and Abyssinia, many people, including Chamberlain, saw the help by Germany and Italy in the Spanish Civil War as a possible threat to the security of Europe. Since the British army was almost nonexistent and the French army was in a defensive mode, the two major powers of the continent

never considered military action against the aggressor countries. However, many leaders of Europe appealed to the League of Nations to impose economic sanctions against Italy and Germany. To Chamberlain this was heresy. Imposing economic sanctions against countries already in an economically desperate situation would only worsen the problem and possibly lead to war. Instead, Chamberlain, still as chancellor of the Exchequer, offered an argument against the proposed sanctions and a diplomatic settlement along the lines of fixing the flawed Treaty of Versailles as a solution. In a speech before the 1900 Club, Chamberlain argued against the applying of economic sanctions.

Is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves, I do not say war, but a risk of war? Is it not apparent that that risk must increase with proportion to the effectiveness of the sanctions and also by reason of the incompleteness of the League? Is it not also apparent from what has happened that in the presence of such a risk nations cannot be relied upon to proceed to the last extremity of war unless their vital interests are threatened?

That being so, does it not suggest that it might be wise to explore the possibilities of localizing the danger spots of the world and trying to find a more practical method of securing peace by means of regional arrangements which could be approved by the League, but which should be guaranteed only by those nations whose interests were vitally connected with the danger zones?<sup>4</sup>

In addition to his pleas for cool heads to prevail over the Rhineland and Abyssinia crisis, Chamberlain also realized the possible threat to British economic and national security that the Italians and Germans posed. In addition to the expanding powers on the European continent, Chamberlain also saw the Japanese expansion in to China as a threat to the security of the British Empire. To answer this threat, Chamberlain proposed the modest rearmament of the British military. In the publication of the 1936 White Paper, he proposed a five-year program to rearm the British military at a cost of £1,500 million. To pay for the program, the national budget would be changed to offset most the cost and £400 million would have to be borrowed. Chamberlain, however, saw the rearming of the British military as a short-term arrangement that would stop once the military was

again strong enough to adequately provide for British security throughout the world.

Once this was achieved, the money could then be returned to providing a balanced budget and meeting the financial needs of the social programs needed in Britain.<sup>5</sup>

Despite his proposal for rearmament, Chamberlain's fear of another world war still dictated his thinking. In his proposal, he argued against the allocating of funds to each branch of the military on an equal basis. Because of the military ideology of Britain, any rearming efforts would require the buildup to the size needed to fight another continental war. In his White Paper, Chamberlain argued for the buildup of the air force and not the army. Chamberlain reasoned if a war was necessary, fighting it with an air force would not result in the catastrophic loss of life of the Great War. In addition, Chamberlain reasoned the buildup of the air force would not require as much money to build and to maintain. Despite the proposal's opposition, Chamberlain found widespread support for his rearmament policy in the House of Commons and with the British people. It is this popularity that leads to Chamberlain's winning of the Prime Minister position in early 1937.<sup>6</sup>

As Chamberlain rose to power in Britain it became more and more obvious to the leaders of Europe of Hitler's desire to unify the German people under one government. As 1937 progressed, these leaders understood that to unify the German people would mean conquering Austria and Czechoslovakia. While Britain had no real interest in the sovereignty of these two countries, Chamberlain saw the French alliances with these two countries, especially Czechoslovakia as being a problem that could lead into a widespread war among the major powers of the continent.<sup>7</sup>

During the summer of 1937 Chamberlain's peace policy took on two separate routes. Chamberlain sent Lord Edward Halifax to Germany to meet with the leaders of the country. Halifax returned to Britain and reported to the cabinet a report of the meeting in Germany. Halifax reported that General Goering, with Hitler's approval, had said that he could foresee no problem in the future that would cause the two nations to fight. Halifax further reported that Hitler was pleased with Austro-German Agreement of 1936 as long as Austria was able to guarantee the safety of the German population living in Austria. He also told the cabinet that Hitler did not foresee any problem in Czechoslovakia as long as the government treated the Germans within its borders well. Finally, Lord Halifax mentioned to the cabinet of Hitler's desire to see the destruction of bombing airplanes in an effort of reducing the size of the militaries of Europe.<sup>8</sup>

Chamberlain saw the visit of Lord Halifax a tremendous success. The idea of the two countries having a common ground to begin negotiations of troubling issues gave Chamberlain reason to expect a peaceful solution. Using this as a stepping stone, Chamberlain foresaw the settling of the colonial problems that had arisen between Germany and Britain. Especially pleasing to Chamberlain was the idea of a reduction in the size of the militaries of the countries of Europe. As far as the questions over Austria and Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain found Hitler's demands quite reasonable since it was only natural for a German leader to want to protect German people not only in Germany but also throughout the world.<sup>9</sup>

Excited about the possibility of the two countries reaching a mutual understanding and therefore, avoiding a war, Chamberlain offered to negotiate a settlement to the colonial problem facing Germany and Britain, which would secure the British colonies

against German aggression throughout the world. In a committee meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee, Chamberlain outlined his plan to answer the colonial question.

The new concept should be based on the complete equality of the Powers concerned and of their all being subjected to certain limitations of the African territories to be administered by them under the scheme. Germany could be brought into the arrangement by becoming one of the African Colonial Powers in question and by being given certain territories to administer. The idea is that two lines should be drawn across Africa, the northern line running roughly to the south of the Sahara, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, and the southern line running roughly to the south of Portuguese East Africa. There should be a general agreement among the Powers concerned that all the territories between the two lines should be subjected to the proposed new rules and regulations covering the administration of the territories.<sup>10</sup>

Chamberlain sent his Ambassador to Germany, Nevile Henderson, to give the proposal to Hitler. However, before the two leaders met, reports had been surfacing of the Austrian government forcefully trying to silence Austrian Germans who wished unification with Germany. When the two finally met on March 3, 1938, Henderson reported that Hitler was in a fit of hysteria. Henderson further reported that Hitler found the colonies being offered were not the colonies that had any interest to Hitler. It was also reported back to Chamberlain that Hitler seemed to be insulted that this proposal was sent at a time when Germans in northern Austria were being persecuted by the Austrian government. To Hitler the colonial question was one that could be settled 10 years later, but the Austrian problem needed all of his attention at the present.<sup>11</sup>

During this same time period, Chamberlain made overtures to the French to avoid causing a war to escalate over matters that did not threaten the economic or national security of either country. In a meeting with French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos, Chamberlain set out to see how serious the French were in attempting to stop German expansion in central and southeastern Europe. Chamberlain asked Delbos what conditions would have to be present for the French to activate their treaties. Delbos replied that if there were no acts of aggression, the treaty would not apply, but if there

were uprisings provoked by Germany, then the treaty would be enforced. Chamberlain then asked if the diplomat say any way of preventing German expansion in Central Europe short of using force. To this Delbos replied,

If Great Britain and France manifested their will to impose the respect for law, this would make Germany more reasonable. There were two courses—to let things slide, and the result would be obvious, or to take an interest in the problem in the spirit of conciliation. If we did the latter the situation would not be altogether desperate.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the overture to Hitler regarding the colonial problem and hope of the French to avoid war if possible, the events of early March 1938 were problematic for the Chamberlain government. Any armed aggression by Hitler in Austria could provoke any of the powers of Europe to come to the aid of Austria. However, Chamberlain could only watch as a spectator. Fortunately, Chamberlain's worst fears were not realized at this time. A series of events in Austria led to the peaceful annexation of Austria into the German Reich. In fact, Chamberlain saw the 99.75% vote of the Austrians favoring to unite with Germany as a sign of reason winning and war being avoided.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the peace of mind that Chamberlain claimed to have over the Austrian situation, Chamberlain supported a move to further rearm the British military. Chamberlain supported a tax increase to help offset the cost of the military buildup and supported a move to raise the borrowing limit for military buildup from £400 million to £800 million.<sup>14</sup> Despite his commitment to keeping a balance budget, stimulating the economy and avoiding war, these moves on rearmament contradict every issue that Chamberlain worked for. Chamberlain understood economics and knew that increasing the budget deficit and raising taxes would only hurt the British efforts to fully recover from the worldwide depression of the 1930s. During these budget moves, Chamberlain showed an understanding of the problems the continent of Europe was facing in the

summer of 1938. In a letter to Lord Halifax, Chamberlain wrote, “It is very necessary to remember these Dictators are men of moods. Catch them in the right mood and they will give you anything you ask for. But if the mood changes, they may shut up like an oyster.”<sup>15</sup>

Soon after the annexation of Austria, the Germans in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia began demanding union with Germany. When the Czechoslovakian government attempted to stop the demands of the Germans, Hitler demanded the Sudetenland be turned over to Germany so that Germans could rule Germans.<sup>16</sup> With this demand of increasing the size of Germany even more, many within the British government, most notably Winston Churchill, began to demand German expansion be stopped and, if necessary, with the threat of force. In a speech before the House of Commons, Churchill said,

If a number of States were assembled around Great Britain and France in a solemn treaty for mutual defense against aggression; if they had their forces marshaled in what you may call a Grand Alliance; if they had their Staff arrangements concerted; if all this rested, as it can honorably rest, upon the Covenant of the League of Nations; if that were sustained, as it would be, by the moral sense of the world; and if it were done in the year 1938—and, believe me, it may be the last chance there will be for doing it—then I say that you might even now arrest this approaching war. Then perhaps the curse which overhangs Europe would pass away.<sup>17</sup>

However, Chamberlain disagreed with Churchill’s use of force to stop Germany. To Chamberlain the idea of a “Grand Alliance” sounded too much like the start of the Great War, which, of course, Chamberlain wanted to avoid. In reality, Chamberlain saw this round of German expansion as economically motivated.<sup>18</sup> During a Foreign Policy Committee meeting, Chamberlain said,

...no country liked to be dependent on a single customer, and it was quite natural for Germany, as for other countries, to endeavor to find as many buyer of her goods as possible so as to be able to play one off against another and so secure better terms. I am doubtful that the improvement of the German economic situation would necessarily be a bad thing. Might not a great improvement in Germany’s economic situation result in her becoming quieter and less interested in political adventures.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to the desire to see a stronger German economy as a means to keeping peace in Europe, Chamberlain answered Churchill's proposal for the threat of force as a moot point because of the lack of readiness of the British military. Chamberlain believed if the British threatened the use of force if Germany expanded and did not actually use force if the situation presented itself, then the British government would be embarrassed to the point of uselessness, which would only worsen the tense political situation of Europe. In a meeting with French diplomats, Chamberlain said,

This was what the Americans in their card games called bluff. It amounted to advancing a certain declaration in the hope that that declaration would prevent the events we did not wish to occur. But it was not a certainty that such action would be successful. It might be true that the chances against war were 100-1, but so long as one chance existed we must consider carefully what our attitude must be, and how we should be prepared to act in the event of war.<sup>20</sup>

In the spring of 1938 the German minority in the Sudetenland became Chamberlain's greatest fear. The Germans were beginning to demand union with greater Germany. The Czechoslovakian government, however, was refusing to yield to the demands of the German minority. Chamberlain's greatest fear, however, became a realization when reports from Central Europe on May 19 confirmed German troop movements along the Czechoslovakian border. A sign the Nazis were planning an invasion to capture the Sudetenland. Chamberlain believed if this happened, France would come to the aid of its ally and the whole continent would be brought into war.<sup>21</sup>

Despite his fears of another continental war and his desire to avoid it, Chamberlain continued his process of rearming the British military. In March 1938, almost two weeks after the German annexation of Austria, the British government, with the support of Chamberlain, raised taxes to pay for an increase in the military budget for the coming fiscal year.<sup>22</sup> Also, Chamberlain supported a £6 million loan to Turkey.

Chamberlain publicly announced the loan had been granted for diplomatic, and not business, reasons. Chamberlain believed this was the first time Britain had used its economic clout for political ends. The long-term goal of this loan was to strengthen Turkey's ability to stop Hitler if he continued expanding into southeastern Europe.<sup>23</sup>

Even though he was preparing Britain for the worst, Chamberlain never doubted the ability of diplomacy to solve the tense situation. Almost immediately after learning of the demands of the Sudetenland Germans, Chamberlain endorsed the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany.<sup>24</sup> However, this policy met with much resistance from Czechoslovakia. After Germany had made its demands for the Sudetenland, Poland and Hungary began demanding land where its native citizens lived in Czechoslovakia. The government felt that if it gave in to Hitler's Germany, then it would have to give in to the other countries, which would leave Czechoslovakia militarily vulnerable to any of its neighboring countries.<sup>25</sup>

As the summer of 1938 entered July, Germany still continued a military buildup on the border of Czechoslovakia. On July 28, Henderson cabled back to warning of the Sudetenland situation.

I hear from a source which cannot be entirely disregarded that a movement is on foot among the forward section of the Nazi Party, including Ribbentrop, to stage some sort of test mobilisation on August 15...Hitler is said to have given no final decision and though he has hitherto stood out strongly against the idea he is believed to be yielding somewhat now. The decision is anyway to be made this week.<sup>26</sup>

The news of the German mobilization brought Chamberlain back early from his summer vacation of fishing and relaxation. However, in his return Chamberlain became worried that his whole plan to avoid another war was unraveling. A war, Chamberlain believed, Britain was not ready for. As more and more reports came to London about German movements around the border and rumors of possible dates of the planned

German invasion into the Sudetenland, Chamberlain actively began seeking a peaceful solution to the crisis, which was a personal visit to Hitler to negotiate a settlement of the Sudetenland, which Chamberlain had nicknamed “Plan Z.” Chamberlain hoped to get Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Germany for a promise from Germany to not invade Czechoslovakia.<sup>27</sup>

On September 13, the British government received notice from France that if German troops entered into Czechoslovakia, the French government would be forced to “fulfill her obligation” of military aid to the Czechoslovakian government.<sup>28</sup> With the threat of another continental war at hand, Chamberlain decided to act immediately and sent this brief personal note to Hitler.

In view of increasingly critical situation I propose to come over at once to see you with a view of trying to find a peaceful solution. I propose to come across by air and am ready to start tomorrow.

Please indicate earliest time at which you can see me and suggest a place of meeting, Should be grateful for very early reply.<sup>29</sup>

When news returned from Hitler on the next day accepting the Prime Minister’s proposed meeting, Chamberlain and all of Britain was elated. As Chamberlain’s plane left Britain on September 15, all domestic opposition to appeasement paled before the enormous popular support that seemed to be coming from all directions of British society. The stocks on the stock exchange rose, and the newspapers seemed to be trying to outdo each other in their praise and support of the prime minister.<sup>30</sup>

The meeting between the two leaders with Hitler giving a long account of what he had done for Germany and how he saw the European crisis. Hitler then attacked the movement in Britain for a war against Germany and said the Anglo-German Naval

Treaty had been made on the premise of the two countries not engaging in war, and if war were to take place between the two countries, then the treaty would be denounced.

Hitler then turned the conversation to Czechoslovakia. Hitler made it clear to Chamberlain that it was absolutely necessary for the three million Germans living in the Sudetenland to be incorporated into the Reich. Hitler further said that he would be willing to risk world war in order to make sure German people governed the German people. Chamberlain responded, "... you say that the three million Sudetenland Germans must be included in the Reich; would you be satisfied with that and is there nothing more that you want? I ask because there are many people who think that is not all." Hitler assured that when the German land of Czechoslovakia was returned to Germany, the Hungarians and the Polish areas of Czechoslovakia would succeed, therefore leaving a country "so small he would not bother his head about it."

The discussion then turned to which lands should be turned over to Germany. Chamberlain suggested lands where the German population exceeded 80-percent. Hitler responded that percentages should not come into this. He wanted the areas where the German population was a majority, and the Czechoslovaks in the areas would be allowed to leave the Sudetenland without incident. Hitler then said, "I am determined to settle it and to settle it soon and I am prepared to risk war rather than allow this to drag on."

To this Chamberlain replied, "If the Fuhrer is determined to settle this matter by force without even waiting for a discussion between ourselves to take place, what did he let me come here for? I have wasted my time...I do not see then how we can make any further progress unless the Fuhrer had got anything further to suggest." This was a huge gamble and Chamberlain was placing his entire appeasement policy on Hitler's response.

If the Hitler says there is nothing further, war is imminent. However, Hitler responded, “Well if the British Government were prepared to accept the idea of secession in principle and to say so, there might be a chance then to have a talk.” Chamberlain knew he did not have the authority to promise this, and would have to talk this proposal over with the French and the Czechoslovakian government. In return, Hitler gave a promise he would do his best to refrain his military from invasion while Chamberlain consulted the French and the Czechoslovaks.<sup>31</sup>

While Chamberlain began his efforts of persuading the French to go along with Hitler’s demand for the Sudetenland, he received encouraging reports from Germany. Henderson reported from Berlin on September 17 that,

Field Marshall Goering spoke in very admiring and respectful manner this morning of Prime Minister. His language was undoubtedly based on impression created on Herr Hitler. ‘Neither England nor Germany’ he said ‘could afford to allow Prime Minister’s gesture in flying to Berchtesgaden to remain without results.’<sup>32</sup>

On September 18, Chamberlain met with French Premier Edouard Daladier and Georges Bonnet to discuss the meeting with Hitler. Chamberlain told the French there was only one way to avoid a war and that was to accept the idea of self-determination of the Germans in the Sudetenland. Further Chamberlain warned if the principle was not accepted, Hitler would use it as a justification of force to achieve his goals in the Sudetenland. When that happened, Chamberlain continued, other countries with a claim to Czechoslovakian land would pursue a similar strategy to achieve their goals, which would leave the Czechoslovakian state in ruins. Chamberlain proposed to the French the idea of outright cession of the entire Sudetenland to Germany provided the non-Germans in the area would be allowed to leave unhurt. The French were willing to accept the idea of a peaceful exchange of land in return for a promise of no further action against their

military ally.<sup>33</sup> The two countries then sent a message to Prague urging the government to cede to Germany all Czech territory in which Germans constituted a majority of the population and offering to guarantee the remainder of the Czech state against unprovoked aggression.<sup>34</sup> At no time during the meetings, however, did any of the British delegates mention Hitler's demand for the Hungarian and Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia to be appeased also.

While the British and French leaders were meeting on No. 10 Downing Street, the Czechs received word of a warning from Hitler. Hitler had demanded that for every German arrested in the Sudetenland, one Czech would be arrested on German land. Also, Hitler warned that any Sudeten German shot would result in the shooting of an equal number of Czechs in Germany.<sup>35</sup> In addition to the warning placed on the government in Prague, when Britain and France had sent their cession offer to Prague, the French had sent an additional letter to President Eduard Benes. In that letter the French told Benes that if he did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, France would disinterest herself in Czechoslovakia's fate.<sup>36</sup> On the morning of September 21, Ambassador Newton informed the British government that the Czechs had reluctantly accepted the proposals concerning the Sudetenland and hoped the two governments had the best interests of the Czechoslovakian state in mind.<sup>37</sup>

Upon receiving word of the Czechoslovakian decision, a triumphant Chamberlain arranged for another meeting with Hitler to take place on September 22 in Godesberg, Germany. Before leaving, Chamberlain met with his cabinet to discuss the trip and what might come up during the negotiations and to what the French or Czechoslovaks might

not agree. During this meeting, the Cabinet set out agreed guidelines for the Prime Minister at his second meeting with Herr Hitler, among which were:

- (1) That if Hitler would not reach a settlement without including the Hungarian and Polish minorities, the Prime Minister should say he must return home to consult his colleagues.
- (2) Regarding the proposed guarantee to the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia, the Prime Minister should proceed on the basis that France, Great Britain and Russia are the joint guarantors.<sup>38</sup>

Chamberlain met with Hitler at the Hotel Dreeson in Godesberg. Emphatically, Chamberlain told Hitler of his convincing of his British colleagues, the French and then the Czechs to accept the principle of cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Chamberlain believed now the two leaders could get on with the more serious problems between the two countries. Chamberlain's high hopes were immediately dashed. Hitler wondered if the agreement of the Czechs were the same as his demands from the Berchtesgaden meeting. Therefore, Hitler said:

It was his duty...to remind the British Prime Minister of the demands of the other nationalities within Czechoslovakia, and that the latter had the sincere sympathy of the German Reich, and that peace could not be established in Central Europe until the claims of all these nationalities had been settled.<sup>39</sup>

This was exactly what Chamberlain could not discuss. Instead, however, of returning home as his cabinet had ordered him to do if this subject was breached, Chamberlain expressed his disappointment with the Fuhrer. Chamberlain told Hitler that he simply could not believe that, after he had granted Hitler everything he had demanded, the German Fuhrer would rather use force as a means of reaching a settlement. Hitler responded with more demands. Hitler informed Chamberlain that if peace were to remain in Central Europe, the Czechs must withdraw from the Sudetenland at once and be replaced by the German army. In addition, Hitler demanded, all Czech troops, police and State organs must immediately be removed from the German-speaking areas. Hitler

informed Chamberlain the Czechs would not be compensated for their losses and that after the occupation of the Sudetenland was complete, a plebiscite would be held in the Sudetenland to determine which areas would be returned to the Czechs. After Hitler's demands were outlined, the meeting was adjourned until the following day.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile, Chamberlain's opposition back home was gaining momentum. A Mass Observation poll of September 22 showed that only twenty-two percent of the British public supported Chamberlain's policy, and a full forty-percent opposed it. Newspapers were also beginning to question the wisdom of the Prime Minister's policies toward Germany. Political opposition began again with many, including Churchill, making speeches against the appeasement policy. If that was not enough, news from Czechoslovakia reported that the Sudeten German Freikorps had occupied the district of Asch.<sup>41</sup>

The second day of the Godesberg meetings began with Hitler granting minor changes in wording of his proposals, however, he refused to alter the demand for immediate military occupation of the Sudetenland and the solution to the other ethnic minorities in the Czech state. Chamberlain pleaded with Hitler to back down. At this time, Chamberlain stressed he had no real interest in the Czechoslovakian state, only that the Fuhrer's proposals would not be accepted by the French or the Czechs, and, therefore, could lead to world war. When Hitler refused to back down, Chamberlain promised he would work to see that Hitler's demands were met, and agreed to transmit the proposals to the Czechs. In return, Hitler promised again not to invade while Chamberlain worked on the proposed arrangement. On that note the meeting adjourned and Chamberlain returned to London.<sup>42</sup>

Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's personal secretary, noted that Chamberlain seemed to think that Hitler was ready, and almost eager, for war. However, Chamberlain met with his cabinet on September 24 to review the discussion between Chamberlain and Hitler at Godesberg. At the meeting, Chamberlain announced the only way to avoid a general war over the Czechoslovakian problem was to give Hitler everything he demanded. At this meeting, for the first time, there began to be evidence from some cabinet members of dissension in Chamberlain's appeasement policy. Most notable among the dissenters was Lord Halifax who questioned what Hitler would want next if the Godesberg demands were met. Nevertheless, notice was sent to Paris and to Prague of Hitler's new set of demands.<sup>43</sup> To make matters even more desperate, British diplomats in Berlin reported to London of Hitler's demand that Czechoslovakia give Germany the Sudetenland by 2:00 p.m. on September 28 or Hitler would mobilize his army and take the land by force. In response to this move by Hitler and the problems in Asch, the Czechoslovakian army, under orders from President Benes, began mobilizing in preparation for an invasion from Germany.<sup>44</sup>

On September 25, the French ministers arrived in London for another meeting to discuss Hitler's demands. At this meeting, however, the French appeared to be vehemently opposed to offering the Godesberg demands to the French. But complicating matters, the French did not say they would go to war against Germany if Hitler did attack Czechoslovakia.<sup>45</sup> On the morning of the 26<sup>th</sup>, Chamberlain proposed to his cabinet one last attempt at peace. He proposed to his cabinet to send Horace Wilson to Germany to ask Hitler for one last face-to-face meeting, and if Hitler refused, then Wilson was to give Hitler a personal message from the Prime Minister. The last effort was accepted

unanimously by the cabinet. In return for the Wilson mission, the cabinet forced Chamberlain to make a guarantee to France that if the French go to war with Germany, the British would aid the efforts.<sup>46</sup>

At 5:00 p.m. on September 26, 1938, Wilson met with Hitler and delivered the letter from Chamberlain asking Hitler “to agree that representatives of Germany shall meet representatives of the Czechoslovakian Government to discuss immediately the situation by which we are confronted with a view to settling by agreement the way in which the territory is to be handed over,” and “offering representation of the British Government at the discussions.”<sup>47</sup> After reading the letter, Hitler said he saw no reason for the meeting to continue. After Wilson insisted the meeting continue, he outlined to the Fuhrer the efforts of the Prime Minister in getting the Godesberg demands implemented by the French. But Hitler was in no mood to hear excuses and “stall tactics.” To Wilson, Hitler reiterated his demand that Czechoslovakia agree to the Godesberg demands by 2:00 p.m. on September 28 or face war. The meeting adjourned without Wilson telling Hitler of Britain’s pledge to fight alongside Czechoslovakia in its upcoming war with Germany.<sup>48</sup>

On the 27<sup>th</sup>, again Wilson met with Hitler to discuss the grave situation on the Czechoslovakian question. At the opening of the conversation, Wilson told Hitler of the British intent of coming to the aid of France if she and Germany were to engage in war. The discussion then turned to various issues on the Sudetenland. After a while, Wilson asked Hitler if there was any way to avoid a world war. To which, Hitler replied there “was only one way and it was a simple way.” It was to tell the Czechs categorically to stop their frivolous game of precipitating a world war and fulfil their undertakings.”

Hitler further stated bitterly that he really resented was that “Czechoslovakia seemed more important in English eyes than Germany.” With that said the meeting ended and Wilson headed back to Britain.<sup>49</sup>

Upon returning to Britain later the same day, Wilson gave an overview of the meeting to the Cabinet. He advised the cabinet to tell the Czechoslovak government to accept Hitler’s demands since this was the last opportunity to avoid war. If Britain desired war, then all she had to, according to Wilson, was do nothing. Reports of the German army’s troop movements along the Czech border further added gloom to an already desperate situation.<sup>50</sup> Resigning to the fact of an impending war, Chamberlain tried one last effort and sent a message to President Benes informing him that if he did not agree to the terms by 2:00 p.m. the following day that “Bohemia would be overthrown and nothing that any other Power can do will prevent this fate for your country and people.”<sup>51</sup>

Later in the evening, Chamberlain addressed the nation about the situation in Europe. The tone of the speech gives the impression that Chamberlain believed a great continental war was only days away. However, he maintained his steadfast commitment to keeping Britain out of a general war.

However much we may sympathise with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbour, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that. I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of force I should feel it must be resisted.

Under such a domination life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living; but war is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call to risk everything in their defence, when all the consequences are weighed, is irresistible.<sup>52</sup>

Further placing Chamberlain’s appeasement policy in jeopardy was the cabinet meeting that took place immediately after the nationally broadcast speech. Many in the

cabinet, including his closest political allies, refused to follow the Prime Minister's line of trying to force the Godesberg demands on Czechoslovakia. Duff Cooper indicated he would resign if the government were to advise the Czechs to accept Hitler's demands. A tired Chamberlain said that if that was the view of the cabinet, he was "prepared to leave it at that."<sup>53</sup>

Depressed and resigned to the start of another great war on the next door, Chamberlain resigned to his room for the evening, but soon he found a light at the end of what to him must have been a very dark tunnel. He received a message from Hitler apologizing for any misconception of his use of force over the Czechs. In the message, Hitler told Chamberlain that his intent was only to militarily occupy the Sudetenland and he gave his personal guarantee that the rest of Czechoslovakia would not in anyway be harmed.<sup>54</sup> Immediately, Chamberlain sat down and replied to Hitler asking for one last face-to-face meeting in the hopes of avoiding war.<sup>55</sup>

The following day in a packed House of Commons, Chamberlain began a speech to recount the events of the last six-months and the most recent events, which included the letter from Hitler that he had received the night before. In addition, Chamberlain informed the House of the letter he had penned to Hitler in hopes of avoiding a war over the Czechoslovakian problem. Furthering seeing hope in what most saw as a grave situation, Chamberlain informed those present of the Mussolini's influence to postpone the mobilization of the German forces to 2:00 p.m. on September 29.<sup>56</sup> After speaking for over an hour, possibly stalling for time, Chamberlain received this note:

Sir Nevile Henderson told me at 3:15 on the telephone that Ministry for Foreign Affairs had just informed him that Herr Hitler invites the Prime Minister to meet him at Munich tomorrow morning. He had also invited Signor Mussolini, who will arrive at 10 a.m., and M. Daladier.<sup>57</sup>

After the note had been read the House of Commons erupted in a roar of approval. Almost everyone in the chamber stood and cheered and threw their papers in the air. News swept through Britain and most people, who had braced for a coming war, were anxious to see if the Prime Minister would be able to avoid war and secure peace for Britain.<sup>58</sup>

In a remarkably quick series of events on the 29<sup>th</sup> of September, the leaders of the four major powers of Europe sat down to hammer out an agreement in Munich to avoid a war among the countries over the Czechoslovakian problem. Almost nothing substantial was negotiated, and when given the usual speed of diplomacy, at a light speed pace. By 2:00 a.m. on the 30<sup>th</sup> Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini and Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. The main feature of the agreement was the German occupation of the Sudetenland, which was to begin on October 1 and would be completed, by the guarantee of France, Britain and Italy, on October 10. Also included in the agreement was the formation of an international council consisting of representatives from the four countries and Czechoslovakia to determine the conditions of evacuation and the final boundary between Germany and Czechoslovakia. England and France entered into the agreement a condition guaranteeing the remainder of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. Once the question of the Hungarian and Polish minorities had been settled, Italy and Germany would join the guarantee.<sup>59</sup> When Czechoslovakia agreed to the decisions at Munich early in the morning on September 30, war in September/October 1938 had been avoided.

However, Chamberlain was not finished at Munich. Early on the morning of the 30<sup>th</sup>, Chamberlain had a private meeting with Hitler to discuss the relationship between

Germany and Britain. Chamberlain found Hitler in conciliatory mood. As Chamberlain brought up issue after issue about the potential problems between the two countries, Hitler simply nodded in acquiescence. Chamberlain talked of disarmament, trade, and colonial issues and each time Hitler simply agreed. Even when the talk turned to a possible war between Germany and Czechoslovakia and Chamberlain hoped that in such a case Germany would refrain from bombing, Hitler responded that “he hated the thought of little babies being killed by gas bombs.” At the end of the conversation Chamberlain produced a prepared document for Hitler to read and, if he agreed to it, to sign. Again, Hitler read the agreement and quickly agreed to sign.<sup>60</sup>

We, the German Fuhrer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and were are determined to continue our efforts to remove the possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.<sup>61</sup>

After the meeting, Chamberlain returned to Britain with a feeling that he had finally achieved the agreement between Germany and Britain that he had been seeking since the beginning of the term as Prime Minister. As he spoke from the first floor window at No. 10 Downing Street, the British people cheered wildly as he said, “I believe it is peace in our time...And now I recommend you to go home and sleep quietly in your beds.”<sup>62</sup> However, as Chamberlain spoke to the people in Britain, he doubted the success of his policy. During the trip from Buckingham Palace to Downing Street, Chamberlain confided to his advisor Halifax, “All of this will be over in three months...Edward [Halifax] we must hope for the best and prepare for the worst.”<sup>63</sup>

Despite the popularity of the Munich Agreement and the subsequent agreement with Hitler, some people in the British government refused to agree that the crisis with expansionist Germany was over. Writing in the October 1938 issue of Current History, Winston Churchill warned about the future.

...But the story of this year is not ended at Czechoslovakia. It is not ended this month. The might behind the German Dictator [Adolph Hitler] increases daily. His appetite may grow with eating...Neville Chamberlain will perhaps repeat what he said a few weeks ago, that the tension in Europe is greatly relaxed.

...All this time the vast degeneration of the forces of parliamentary democracy will be proceeding throughout Europe. Every six weeks another corps will be added to the German army. All this time important countries and great rail and river communications will pass under the control of the General Staff.

If we study the history of Rome and Carthage, we can understand what happened and why. It is not difficult to form an intelligent view about the three Punic Wars; but if mortal catastrophe should overtake the British Nation and the British Empire, historians a thousand years hence will still be baffled by the mystery of our affairs.

We should lay aside every hindrance and endeavor by uniting the whole force and spirit of our people to raise again a great British nation standing up before all the world; for such a nation, rising in its ancient vigor, can even at this hour save civilization.<sup>64</sup>

Chamberlain refused to listen to his critics as well as many of his advisors.

Believing he had no reason to distrust the intentions of Hitler on September 30, Chamberlain did not believe the buildup of the German army along the Czechoslovakian army meant that Hitler was planning an invasion.<sup>65</sup>

What Chamberlain, and even Churchill, could not have known was Hitler's plan for Czechoslovakia from the very beginning. Ernst von Weizsacker wrote in his diary, after a personal meeting with Hitler, on September 16, 1938, just after the Berchtesgaden meeting, about the plans for Czechoslovakia.

He, the Fuhrer, said if the Czechs reject this proposal [the Berchtesgaden proposal], the way will be clear for a German invasion; if the Czechs yield, then Czechoslovakia's own turn will not come until later, for instance next spring. There are in fact distinct advantages in disposing of the first—Sudeten German—stage amicably.<sup>66</sup>

Also, Chamberlain miscalculated the intentions of the letter he received on September 28. Chamberlain saw the letter as Hitler's desire to avoid a great continental war. In fact, Hitler was forced into finding a peaceful solution to the Sudetenland problem because the German army was not prepared to mobilize against the Czechs and the Italians would be unable to lend support to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hitler still firmly believed he would conquer Czechoslovakia, but not with the military strength he hoped would impress the world. Therefore, Hitler was backed into a corner and used Chamberlain to get him out gracefully and looking victorious. Despite this victorious stance of Hitler at Munich, privately he saw the agreement as a defeat because he was not able to show the world the power of the new German military.<sup>67</sup>

Despite his unwillingness to believe that Hitler would not fulfill the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain further advanced Britain efforts at rearmament. In February 1939, still a month away from the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain supported another tax increase to be used for rearming the military. He also supported an increase in the military borrowing limit from £400 million to £800 million.<sup>68</sup>

Chamberlain's worst nightmare was realized on March 15, 1939 when the German armies attacked and soon occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia. By the 29<sup>th</sup>, under considerable pressure from the parliament, Chamberlain announced that if any event threatened the sovereignty of the Polish state, the British government would lend all of its power and support to the Poles.<sup>69</sup> Soon after this announcement the French also announced its intention to support the Polish government in case of a German invasion. Now the world, according to Chamberlain, was in a 1914 state of alliances and war could not be avoided.<sup>70</sup>

After the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Chamberlain entered the House of Commons on the 3<sup>rd</sup> to declare war on Germany. He stated, “This country is at war with Germany. Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything believed in during my public life has crashed into ruins.”<sup>71</sup> What followed the fall of Poland, however, gave Chamberlain a glimpse of hope. After the Poles had been defeated, the war stopped. While Britain and France were officially at war with Germany, no one was fighting. Chamberlain clung to the hope that the declaration of war had scared Hitler into actually believing another great continental war was at hand. However, in the spring of 1940 Hitler’s army began a series of victories in western Europe. Chamberlain realizing he was not the leader Britain needed in a time of war resigned and the new government under Churchill’s leadership was installed. Appeasement had failed.<sup>72</sup>

Or, had it? What happened after Chamberlain’s resignation is of no question. However, Chamberlain had bought years of time for rearming the British military for a fight against the Germans. While it was not his main goal, Chamberlain was a realist in that he knew that the negotiations of appeasement could break down at any time and war could be at hand. What if the war would have begun in 1937? What would have then happened to the British Empire? Their army was in no condition to fight Northern Ireland, let alone an army with the might of Germany’s. Therefore, the policy of appeasing Hitler, while it did fail in avoiding war, bought Britain valuable time to rearm and the British military was in a better position in 1940, when war was at hand.

Also, in appraising the effectiveness of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy the judgement must not solely rest on the basis of failing to avoid war. No one would argue

about the severity of war. Even our own Robert E. Lee was reported as saying, “It is a good thing war is so awful, lest we grow fond of it.” In order to avoid war, does it not make sense, to then try with all effort to find a peaceful solution to it. This was what Chamberlain hoped would happen. He tried everything he could to avoid the great European nightmare of 1914-1918. Who would not do this? Before war happens, the people of a country need to know everything has been done to avoid the killing of its own soldiers in battle. When judged on this criteria, Chamberlain appeasement policy was very successful. Leaders of the nation of the world approaching the new millennium should take a few moments to ask themselves if they are doing everything they can to avoid military conflict.

In addition, the delay of the start of the war had significant results. If Chamberlain pushed his country to war over the Sudetenland question, what would have been the results? The new British fighter planes and radar would not have been ready to meet on German onslaught in 1939, as they were in 1940. Would the Battle for Poland ever have taken place. If not, would the Polish, or even the British, have ever broken the German Enigma-machine code, which proved invaluable to the Allied war efforts.<sup>73</sup>

Historians will continue to debate both sides of the appeasement policy. Some will point that the entire war could have been avoided with a few stands against the dictators. Others will argue that the German army could have been defeated with much greater ease in 1938 than in 1940. However, the appeasement policy of Chamberlain was followed and his efforts to avoid another great war are, at the very least, extremely noble. While the policy ultimately failed, the time that Chamberlain unintentionally bought for

his country's rearmament was invaluable, and played a part in the Allied success in defeating Hitler and Mussolini in World War Two.

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## NOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> Aldcroft, Derek H., The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 80, 262.
- <sup>3</sup> Fuchser, Larry William, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement, (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 51-53.
- <sup>4</sup> Fuchser, 56-7.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid. 62-3.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid. 63-4.
- <sup>7</sup> Rock, William R., British Appeasement in the 1930s, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), 51.
- <sup>8</sup> Colvin, Ian, The Chamberlain Cabinet, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1971.) 51-2.
- <sup>9</sup> Finkel, Alvin, "Chamberlain's Treachery," Canadian Dimension, Sep/Oct 1998, 43. Also, Fuchser, 93.
- <sup>10</sup> Fuchser, 108-9.
- <sup>11</sup> Colvin, 89-92.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 55-6.
- <sup>13</sup> Finkel, 43.
- <sup>14</sup> Kindleberger, Charles R., The World in Depression, 1929-1939, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 281.
- <sup>15</sup> Fuchser, 102.
- <sup>16</sup> Parker, R.A.C. and Gary S. Messinger, "Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War," Journal of Modern History, Summer 1995, p 722.
- <sup>17</sup> Churchill, Winston, "The Annexation of Austria: Speech Before the House of Commons on March 14, 1938," <[www.winstonchurchill.org/austria.htm](http://www.winstonchurchill.org/austria.htm), (version current at 30 June 1999).
- <sup>18</sup> MacDonald, C.A., "Economic Appeasement and the German 'Moderates:' 1937-39," Past and Present, 1972, p. 112.
- <sup>19</sup> Fuchser., 132.
- <sup>20</sup> Chamberlain's view on threatening war and the quote is contained in Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. 1, Document No. 164.
- <sup>21</sup> Fuchser, 126-8.
- <sup>22</sup> Kindleberger, 282.
- <sup>23</sup> Fuchser, 131-132 and Colvin 135.
- <sup>24</sup> Parker, 731.
- <sup>25</sup> Colvin 143.
- <sup>26</sup> "Letter from Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Mr. Strong," 28 July 1938, Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 558.
- <sup>27</sup> Fuchser, 135-8.
- <sup>28</sup> "Sir E. Phipps (Paris) to Viscount Halifax" 13 September 1938, Documents of British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 861.
- <sup>29</sup> "Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin)" 13 September 1938, Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 862.
- <sup>30</sup> Fuchser, 141.
- <sup>31</sup> "Notes by Mr. Chamberlain of his conversation with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938," Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 895.
- <sup>32</sup> "Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Viscount Halifax on September 17, 1938," Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 911.
- <sup>33</sup> "Record of Anglo-French Conversations held at No. 10 Downing Street on September 18, 1938," Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 928.
- <sup>34</sup> "Viscount Halifax to Mr. Newton (Prague)" Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 937.
- <sup>35</sup> "Note by Mr. Jebb of a telephone message from the Czechoslovak Minister," Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 921.
- <sup>36</sup> Fuchser, 146.
- <sup>37</sup> "Mr. Newton to Viscount Halifax," Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1002.

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- <sup>39</sup> “Notes of a conversation between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler at Godesberg on September 22, 1938,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1033.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> Fuchser, 149.
- <sup>42</sup> Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1033.
- <sup>43</sup> Colvin, 163.
- <sup>44</sup> Fuchser, 152.
- <sup>45</sup> “Records of an Anglo-French Conversation held at No. 10 Downing Street on September 25, 1938,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No 1093.
- <sup>46</sup> Fuchser, 153.
- <sup>47</sup> “Letter from Mr. Chamberlain to Herr Hitler,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1097.
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- <sup>49</sup> “Notes of a conversation between Sir Horace Wilson and Herr Hitler at Berlin on September 27, 1938,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1129.
- <sup>50</sup> Colvin, 165-6.
- <sup>51</sup> “Viscount Halifax to Sir. N. Henderson,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1140.
- <sup>52</sup> Bryant, 276.
- <sup>53</sup> Colvin 166.
- <sup>54</sup> “Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Viscount Halifax,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1144.
- <sup>55</sup> “Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin),” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1158.
- <sup>56</sup> Bryant, 277-301.
- <sup>57</sup> “Note by Sir A. Cadogan,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document No. 1174.
- <sup>58</sup> Fuchser 159-61.
- <sup>59</sup> “Notes by Sir H. Wilson on the Munich Conference, September 29-30, 1938,” Documents on British Foreign Policy, Document No. 1227.
- <sup>60</sup> “Note of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler, September 30, 1938, at the latter’s flat in Munich,” Documents on British Foreign Policy vol. ii, Document 1228.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>62</sup> Bryant, 302-3.
- <sup>63</sup> Dilks, David, “‘We must hope for the best and prepare for the worst’: the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Hitler’s Germany, 1937-1939,” The Origins of the Second World War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 47.
- <sup>64</sup> Churchill, Winston, “What Can England Do About Hitler,” Current History, October 1938, pp. 24-5,50-1.
- <sup>65</sup> Fuchser, 173-4.
- <sup>66</sup> Irving, David, Hitler’s Army, (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 128-9.
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- <sup>68</sup> Kindleberger, 283.
- <sup>69</sup> Fuchser, 177-8.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid., 179.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid., 187
- <sup>72</sup> Ibid., 190-2.
- <sup>73</sup> Weinberg, Gerhard L., “Munich after 50 Years,” Origins of the Second World War, 409-10.

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